Voluntary Agreements and Non-Verifiable Emissions

Karine Nyborg

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2000, vol. 17, issue 2, 125-144

Abstract: If pollution is observable, but some emissions cannot be verified by court,voluntary agreements between a regulator and an industry may bewelfare-improving compared to second-best emission taxes. Such agreementsdiffer from direct regulation in a non-trivial way. The first-best optimummay be included in the set of possible agreements, even if it is notattainable using tax instruments. The non-verifiability may, for example, beassociated with delimitation problems in defining the pollution tax base. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Keywords: voluntary agreements; second-best tax; non-verifiability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1008313720592

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