(Monopolistic) resource extraction and limit pricing: The market penetration of competitively produced synfuels

Franz Wirl

Environmental & Resource Economics, 1991, vol. 1, issue 2, 157-178

Abstract: This paper analyzes the market penetration of a competitively produced synfuel, e.g., solar energy, in a market that is initially dominated by a resource extracting monopoly. The availability of the renewable substitute depends not only on the price/cost ratio but also on the installed capacities, which reflect historical investments. As a consequence, the resource monopoly faces a discontinuous residual demand schedule. The dynamic interactions between the resource cartel and the synfuel industry are modelled as a differential game; the (open loop) Nash equilibrium is applied to this game. It will be shown that the commodity price will exceed the production costs of the backstop and that the transition from the periods of resource dependence to the backstop technology will be gradual. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991

Keywords: Resource depletion; synfuel; differential game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF00310016 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:enreec:v:1:y:1991:i:2:p:157-178

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... al/journal/10640/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/BF00310016

Access Statistics for this article

Environmental & Resource Economics is currently edited by Ian J. Bateman

More articles in Environmental & Resource Economics from Springer, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().