Ambient Taxes Under m-Dimensional Choice Sets, Heterogeneous Expectations, and Risk-Aversion

Richard Horan, James Shortle and David Abler ()

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2002, vol. 21, issue 2, 189-202

Abstract: We consider the design of ambient taxes forrisk-neutral and risk-averse polluters whenpolluters and the regulatory agency haveasymmetric information about environmentalrelationships and probabilities associatedwith random events. Unlike prior work, we showthat under these conditions, optimal ambienttaxes must be firm-specific, and accompaniedby additional incentives to influencepolluters' choices of abatement techniques. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2002

Keywords: ambient taxes; asymmetric information; nonpoint pollution; risk-aversion; water quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1014584418846

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