The Economics of Shallow Lakes

Karl‑Göran Mäler, Anastasios Xepapadeas and Aart de Zeeuw

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2003, vol. 26, issue 4, 603-624

Abstract: Ecological systems such as shallow lakes areusually non-linear and display discontinuitiesand hysteresis in their behaviour. Thesesystems often also provide conflicting servicesas a resource and a waste sink. This impliesthat the economic analysis of these systemsrequires to solve a non-standard optimalcontrol problem or, in case of a commonproperty resource, a non-standard differentialgame. This paper provides the optimalmanagement solution and the open-loop Nashequilibrium for a dynamic economic analysis ofthe model for a shallow lake. It alsoinvestigates whether it is possible to induceoptimal management in case of common use of thelake, by means of a tax. Finally, some remarksare made on the feedback Nash equilibrium. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003

Keywords: ecological systems; non-linear differential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (144)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The economics of shallow lakes (2003)
Working Paper: The Economics of Shallow Lakes (2000)
Working Paper: The Economics of Shallow Lakes (2000)
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DOI: 10.1023/B:EARE.0000007351.99227.42

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