Forest Conservation – Too Much or Too Little? A Political Economy Model

Essi Eerola

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2004, vol. 27, issue 4, 407 pages

Abstract: This paper studies the formation offorest policy when the government isinfluenced by an environmental lobbyand an industrial lobby representing anon-competitive wood processing industry.Government decides on forestconservation by way of restricting timberharvesting. Lobbying is modelledas a common agency game with differencesin the efficiency of lobbying. Acomparison of the political equilibriashows that an exporting forestindustry faces a stricter conservationrequirement than a forest industrywhose production is destined for domesticmarkets. If the industrial lobbyis more efficient than the environmentallobby, conservation is insufficientfrom the social point of view. However,conservation may be insufficienteven if the environmental lobby is moreefficient in lobbying than theindustrial lobby. This is because thelobbying effort of the environmentallobby also benefits consumers thatremain politically passive. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Keywords: amenity valuation; common agency; forest policy; lobbying; market power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: Forest Conservation - Too Much or Too Little? A Political Economy Model (2000)
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DOI: 10.1023/B:EARE.0000018520.19216.2a

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