Profits from violating controls on the use of a polluting input

Ing-Marie Andréasson-Gren

Environmental & Resource Economics, 1992, vol. 2, issue 5, 459-468

Abstract: Profits from violating the quota, charge and permit market systems are compared. The results indicate that, for a given permit price, the violation profits of the charge and permit market systems are the same and exceed the profits from violating a quota system if the optimal use of inputs in a compliant market is lower than the quota. It is also shown that, under a permit market system, the occurrence of violation decreases the equilibrium price of permits. This implies that the profits from violating a permit market are lower than violation profits of a charge system. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

Keywords: Policy instruments; polluting input; violation profits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00376829

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