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Environmental Enforcement with Endogenous Ambient Monitoring

Laurent Franckx ()

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2005, vol. 30, issue 2, 195-220

Abstract: We consider an inspection game between n polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency. If the cost of monitoring ambient pollution is low enough, the optimal inspection policy consists in imposing the maximal possible fine, and mixing between observing ambient pollution and not conducting any inspection at all. However, with stringent upper limits on the fine, the agency mixes between observing ambient pollution and inspecting all firms. The observation of ambient pollution is always followed by sequentially rational firm inspections. Comparisons with Franckx (2002a, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43, 71–92, 2002b, Topics in Economic Analysis Policy 2(1), Article 1) show that commitment power has a very strong impact on the value of prior information. Copyright Springer 2005

Keywords: ambient monitoring; commitment; environmental enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-004-1514-3

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