Piercing the Veil of Uncertainty in Transboundary Pollution Agreements

Charles Kolstad

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2005, vol. 31, issue 1, 34 pages

Abstract: This paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states. A measure of “difficulty” is constructed related to side-payments necessary to make an agreement a Pareto-improving move. Using a simple model, it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier. Copyright Springer 2005

Keywords: international environmental agreements; pollution; side-payments; transboundary uncertainty; treaties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-004-6980-0

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