A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking

Matti Liski () and Juan-Pablo Montero

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2005, vol. 31, issue 2, 159-173

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the effect of market power on equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms can bank current permits for use in later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (potentially dominant) firm and competitive fringe with rational expectations. We characterize the equilibrium solution for different permits allocations and discuss the large firm’s stock-holding constraints needed for credible market manipulation. Copyright Springer 2005

Keywords: banking; market power; pollution permit; Q52; L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10640-005-1769-3 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking (2004)
Working Paper: A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:enreec:v:31:y:2005:i:2:p:159-173

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... al/journal/10640/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10640-005-1769-3

Access Statistics for this article

Environmental & Resource Economics is currently edited by Ian J. Bateman

More articles in Environmental & Resource Economics from Springer, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().