Transboundary Pollution in the Black Sea: Comparison of Institutional Arrangements

Basak Bayramoglu

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2006, vol. 35, issue 4, 289-325

Abstract: This paper analyses the transboundary pollution between Romania and Ukraine, coastal states along the Black Sea, and studies the welfare consequences of institutional arrangements for controlling this problem. To achieve this goal, we use a dynamic and strategic framework. We compare in terms of total welfare for two countries a first-best case with three different institutional arrangements: the non-cooperative game of countries, the uniform emission policy and the constant emission policy as proposed by the Black Sea Commission. Our findings indicate that the non-cooperative game provides a better level of total welfare than the other rules. Copyright Springer 2006

Keywords: Black Sea; dynamic games; environment; institutional arrangements; non-cooperative games; transboundary pollution; water pollution; C72; C73; Q5; Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Transboundary pollution in the black sea: comparison of institutional arrangements (2004)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-006-9016-0

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