Tradable emission rights and strategic interaction

Nils-Henrik von der Fehr

Environmental & Resource Economics, 1993, vol. 3, issue 2, 129-151

Abstract: The use of tradable emission rights as environmental policy instruments may affect the conditions for strategic interaction between regulated firms and thus have implications for competition policy. This paper presents an analysis of how, and under what conditions, emission rights can be used strategically by oligopolistic firms for predatory and exclusionary purposes. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1993

Keywords: Tradable emission rights; imperfect competition; oligopoly; strategic interaction; predation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993
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Working Paper: Tradable Emission Rights and Strategic Interaction (1991)
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00338781

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