Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agreements with Full Participation: Conditions for Pareto-Efficiency

Geir Asheim and Bjart Holtsmark

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2009, vol. 43, issue 4, 519-533

Keywords: International environmental agreements; Non-cooperative game theory; Pareto efficiency; Weak renegotiation proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-008-9247-3

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