Conservation Auctions and Compliance: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory Experiments

Kentaro Kawasaki (), Takeshi Fujie, Kentaro Koito, Norikazu Inoue and Hiroki Sasaki

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2012, vol. 52, issue 2, 157-179

Keywords: Agri-environmental policies; Auction; Conservation contracting; Compliance; Laboratory experiment; Monitoring; C91—Laboratory; Individual Behavior; D44—Auctions; Q28—Government Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-012-9551-9

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