Uncertainty of Governmental Relief and the Crowding out of Flood Insurance
Paul Raschky (),
Manijeh Schwindt () and
Ferdinand Zahn ()
Environmental & Resource Economics, 2013, vol. 54, issue 2, 179-200
This paper discusses the problem of crowding out of insurance by co-existing governmental relief programs—the so-called ‘charity hazard’—in the context of different institutional schemes of governmental disaster relief in Austria and Germany. We test empirically whether an assured partial relief scheme (as in Austria) drives a stronger crowding out of private insurance than a scheme promising full relief which is subject to ad-hoc political decision making (as in Germany). Our general finding is that the institutional design of governmental relief programs significantly affects the demand for private natural hazard insurance. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2013
Keywords: Insurance demand; Governmental relief; Natural hazards; D78; D81; G22; Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:enreec:v:54:y:2013:i:2:p:179-200
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... al/journal/10640/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Environmental & Resource Economics is currently edited by Ian J. Bateman
More articles in Environmental & Resource Economics from Springer, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().