Can Defaults Save the Climate? Evidence from a Field Experiment on Carbon Offsetting Programs

Jorge Araña () and Carmelo León ()

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2013, vol. 54, issue 4, 613-626

Abstract: Individual preferences for environmental policies can be influenced by the frame in which choices and decisions are presented. In this paper we present results of a field experiment on the contributions to carbon offsetting programs under two alternative treatments for the default option. The opt-in treatment asked subjects to pay for the policy proposal while the opt-out treatment asked subjects if they wanted to be excluded from payment for the policy proposal. The results show that the frame of the default option had a significant effect on the amount of money paid for the policy proposal. Subjects were more likely to accept the policy proposal if the default option was the opt-out treatment. The results have implications for the design of environmental policies. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Keywords: Carbon offsetting; Defaults; Environmental policy; Field experiments; Framing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-012-9615-x

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