A Strategic Analysis of Eutrophication Abatement in the Baltic Sea

Lassi Ahlvik and Yulia Pavlova ()

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2013, vol. 56, issue 3, 353-378

Abstract: Cooperation between the littoral countries of the Baltic Sea to mitigate eutrophication has proven difficult in the past. In this study, we explore the countries’ incentives to free-ride on agreements, find stable coalitions where free-riding is deterred, and propose alternative ways of designing stable agreements that would reduce eutrophication in the sea. We conclude that strong free-riding incentives for some countries preclude the socially optimal solution in the absence of an enforcing authority. A stable agreement can, however, be formed with some loss in efficiency. The research shows that a treaty with modest abatement targets between all the littoral countries would be more efficient than a coalition between fewer countries but with more ambitious targets. We compare the two international institutions involved in the protection of the Baltic Sea—the intergovernmental Helsinki Commission and the partly supranational European Union—and show that the European Union would not benefit from enforcing an agreement among its member states on the Baltic without Russia being involved in the conservation efforts. Our results suggest that efficient abatement and full participation could be achieved by using the power the European Union has to enforce such an agreement among its members and, simultaneously, negotiating with Russia within the Helsinki Commission. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Keywords: Baltic Sea; Consensus treaty; Eutrophication; Focal treaty; International environmental agreement; Self-enforcement; Q25; Q53; C72; F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-013-9651-1

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