Quota Enforcement in Resource Industries: Self-Reporting and Differentiated Inspections

Lars Hansen, Frank Jensen () and Linda Nøstbakken

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2014, vol. 58, issue 4, 539-562

Abstract: Quotas are frequently used in the management of renewable resources and emissions. However, in many industries there is concern about their basic effectiveness due to non-compliance. We develop an enforcement model of a quota-regulated resource and focus on a situation with significant non-compliance and exogenous constraints on fines and enforcement budget. We propose a new enforcement system based on self-reporting of excess extraction and explicit differentiation of inspection rates depending on compliance history. We use differentiated inspections to induce firms to self-report excess extraction. This system increases the effectiveness of the quota by allowing the regulator to implement a wider range of aggregate extraction targets than under traditional enforcement, while ensuring an efficient allocation of extraction. In addition, inspection costs can be reduced without reductions in welfare. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Keywords: Enforcement; Non-compliance; Self-reporting; Differentiated inspections; Quotas; Resource management; Fisheries; D61; H0; Q20; Q22; Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Quota Enforcement in Resource Industries: Self-Reporting and Differentiated Inspections (2011)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-013-9709-0

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