Managing the international commons: Resource use and pollution control

Anastasios Xepapadeas

Environmental & Resource Economics, 1995, vol. 5, issue 4, 375-391

Abstract: The simultaneous management, in an international context, of free-access renewable resources and transboundary pollution, is examined in a dynamic game framework. First-best outcomes under international cooperation are determined and compared to noncooperative outcomes when countries follow linear Markov strategies. An international policy consisting of taxes on emissions and harvesting, with international redistribution of tax receipts, is used to achieve the cooperative solution. In addition, side payments may be required to prevent free riding and thus make the international policy implementable. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Keywords: Transboundary pollution; open-access resource; differential game; Markov strategies; international taxes/reimbursements; free riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00691575

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