The Compensation Regime in Liability Law: Incentives to Curb Environmental Harm, Ex Ante and Ex Post

Alfred Endres () and Tim Friehe

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2015, vol. 62, issue 1, 105-123

Abstract: This paper analyzes private incentives for precautions against environmental harm before accidents occur and for clean-up after the fact. We consider the compensatory regimes used in various jurisdictions, which differ in terms of the basis for compensation (the level of harm, clean-up costs, or some combination of the two) and the resulting levels of compensation. We establish that socially optimal decisions are usually not induced by liability law in any of the compensatory regimes. However, the different types and levels of compensation have distinct effects, allowing the policy maker to identify the most appropriate regime for specific circumstances. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Keywords: Environmental liability law; Environmental harm; Compensation; Precautions; Clean-up; K 13; Q 58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-014-9817-5

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