On the Timing of Climate Agreements

Robert Schmidt and Roland Strausz

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2015, vol. 62, issue 3, 547 pages

Abstract: A central issue in climate policy is the question whether long-term targets for greenhouse gas emissions should be adopted. This paper analyzes strategic effects related to the timing of such commitments. Using a two-country model, we identify a redistributive effect that undermines long-term cooperation when countries are asymmetric and side payments are unavailable. The effect enables countries to shift rents strategically via their R&D efforts under delayed cooperation. In contrast, a complementarity effect stabilizes long-term cooperation, because early commitments in abatement induce countries to invest more in low-carbon technologies, and create additional knowledge spillovers. Contrasting both effects, we endogenize the timing of climate agreements. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Keywords: Climate treaty; Abatement; Long-term cooperation; Spillover; Strategic delay; D62; F53; H23; Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: On the timing of climate agreements (2014)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-014-9828-2

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