Evolution of Reciprocity in Asymmetric International Environmental Negotiations

Marius Ochea () and Aart Zeeuw ()

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2015, vol. 62, issue 4, 837-854

Abstract: We study the success of generalised trigger strategies in the evolution of cooperation in international environmental negotiations where the performance of these strategies is derived from asymmetric $$n$$ n -player prisoners’ dilemmas. Our results suggest that there exist regions in the relevant parameter space—i.e. costs and benefits, low and high tit-for-tat thresholds, probability of continued interaction—such that (partial) cooperation may emerge as long-run attractor of the evolutionary dynamics in these asymmetric social dilemmas. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Keywords: International environmental negotiations; Tit-for-tat; Replicator dynamics; Asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma; C72; C73; D62; H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-014-9841-5

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