Common Pool Politics and Inefficient Fishery Management

Julia Hoffmann () and Martin Quaas

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2016, vol. 63, issue 1, 79-93

Abstract: Fisheries management often fails because total allowable catches (TACs) are set at inefficiently high levels. To study why decision-makers choose such high TACs, we model the annual negotiation on TACs as a dynamic game in discrete time. TACs are fixed by majority decision in a council consisting of decision-makers who are heterogeneous with respect to their discount rates. We show that the optimal feedback strategy for the less patient decision-makers will set inefficiently high TACs in Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. A binding commitment to a long-term management plan could help solving this problem and lead to a more sustainable fishery management. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Keywords: Fisheries; Fishery economics; Environmental uncertainty; Constant escapement; Political economy; Dynamic game theory; Q22; Q57; D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-014-9842-4

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