A Dynamic Game of Emissions Pollution with Uncertainty and Learning

Nahid Masoudi, Marc Santugini and Georges Zaccour
Additional contact information
Marc Santugini: HEC Montréal

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2016, vol. 64, issue 3, No 1, 349-372

Abstract: Abstract We introduce learning in a dynamic game of international pollution, with ecological uncertainty. We characterize and compare the feedback non-cooperative emissions strategies of players when the players do not know the distribution of ecological uncertainty but they gain information (learn) about it. We then compare our learning model with the benchmark model of full information, where players know the distribution of ecological uncertainty. We find that uncertainty due to anticipative learning induces a decrease in total emissions, but not necessarily in individual emissions. Further, the effect of structural uncertainty on total and individual emissions depends on the beliefs distribution and bias. Moreover, we obtain that if a player’s beliefs change toward more optimistic views or if she feels that the situation is less risky, then she increases her emissions while others react to this change and decrease their emissions.

Keywords: Pollution emissions; Dynamic games; Uncertainty; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D81 D83 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10640-014-9873-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: A Dynamic Game of Emissions Pollution with Uncertainty and Learning (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:enreec:v:64:y:2016:i:3:d:10.1007_s10640-014-9873-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... al/journal/10640/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10640-014-9873-x

Access Statistics for this article

Environmental & Resource Economics is currently edited by Ian J. Bateman

More articles in Environmental & Resource Economics from Springer, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().