The Incentives for North-South Transfer of Climate-Mitigation Technologies with Trade in Polluting Goods

Matthieu Glachant, Julie Ing () and Jean Philippe Nicolai ()
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Julie Ing: Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich
Jean Philippe Nicolai: Chair of Integrative Risk Management and Economics at ETH Zurich

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2017, vol. 66, issue 3, No 3, 435-456

Abstract: Abstract The need to transfer climate mitigation technologies towards the developing world has been acknowledged since the beginning of climate negotiations. Little progress has however been made, as shown by Article 10 of the Paris Agreement. One reason is that these technologies could become vital assets to compete on global markets. This paper presents a partial equilibrium model with two regions, the North and the South, and imperfect competition in the international polluting goods market, to analyze the North’s incentives to accept technology transfer. Results crucially depend on the existence of environmental cooperation. When both northern and southern governments set emission quotas non-cooperatively, inducing fewer global emissions is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the North to accept the transfer. In contrast, when governments set quotas cooperatively, the North has no incentive to share its technology either before or after the agreement. Technology transfer commitments may be included in the agreement, but with no effect on global emissions and global surplus. The only impacts are distributional, technology transfers and side payments may be substitute instruments.

Keywords: Technology transfer; Imperfect competition; Climate policy; Environmental cooperation; Cap and trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 F18 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: The Incentives for North-South Transfer of Climate-Mitigation Technologies with Trade in Polluting Goods (2017)
Working Paper: The incentives to North-South transfer of climate-mitigation technologies with trade in polluting goods (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-016-0087-2

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