(Un)fair Delegation: Exploring the Strategic Use of Equity Rules in International Climate Negotiations

Andreas Lange and Claudia Schwirplies ()
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Claudia Schwirplies: University of Hamburg

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2017, vol. 67, issue 3, No 6, 505-533

Abstract: Abstract We provide a new approach for identifying a strategic use of equity arguments in international (climate) negotiations. We first develop a theoretical model of strategic delegation which accounts for both environmental as well as equity preferences. We show that the strategic use of equity arguments qualitatively depends on the extent to which environmental preferences can be misrepresented: representatives from different countries may be expected to have similar equity views rather than widely differing perceptions of a fair share. Based on survey data on climate negotiations, we then provide empirical evidence for differences between equity preferences of citizens from Germany, China, and the U.S. and the perceived view on the position of their respective countries.

Keywords: International environmental negotiations; Climate policy; Strategic delegation; Equity rules; Fairness principles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-017-0140-9

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