Agri-environmental Policies and Public Goods: An Assessment of Coalition Incentives and Minimum Participation Rules

Matteo Zavalloni (), Meri Raggi and Davide Viaggi
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Matteo Zavalloni: University of Bologna

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2019, vol. 72, issue 4, No 6, 1023-1040

Abstract: Abstract An increasing number of papers analyse the inclusion of collective/spatial conditionality constraints in agricultural policies dealing with natural resource management. In this article we theoretically assess the conditions in which employing collective conditionality constraints linked to incentives better reach the social preferences on PG provision by agriculture. We deal with this issue by using a coalition formation model to endogenize the size of the group of farmers cooperating, and investigate how it is affected by different policy schemes. We analyse and compare the following policy schemes: (1) a homogenous payment that target the whole population of farmers, (2) a coalition bonus, that incentivizes only the contributions by the coalition members, and (3) a coalition bonus associated to a MPR on the size of the coalition. The results show that formulating payments that discriminate between co-operators and free-riders, and associating to such a payment a MPR, is relatively more effective than the traditional homogenous payments. However this is true only under some (local) conditions that we theoretically derived.

Keywords: Agglomeration bonus; Coalition formation; Public good; Biodiversity conservation; Agri-environmental policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-018-0237-9

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