Cooperative Management of Invasive Species: A Dynamic Nash Bargaining Approach

Kelly M. Cobourn (), Gregory S. Amacher and Robert G. Haight
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Kelly M. Cobourn: Virginia Tech
Gregory S. Amacher: Virginia Tech
Robert G. Haight: USDA Forest Service Northern Research Station

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2019, vol. 72, issue 4, No 7, 1068 pages

Abstract: Abstract We use a Nash bargaining framework to examine scope for bargaining in invasive species problems where spread depends on the employment of costly controls. Municipalities bargain over a transfer payment that slows spread but requires an infested municipality to forgo nonmarket benefits from the host species. We find that when the uninfested municipality has a relative bargaining power advantage, bargaining may attain the first-best solution. However, in many cases a short-term bargaining agreement is unlikely to succeed, which suggests a role for higher levels of government to facilitate long-term agreements even when the details are left to municipalities to negotiate.

Keywords: Bioeconomics; Biological invasions; Emerald ash borer; Negotiation; Optimal control; Pest spread (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 Q23 Q57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-018-0238-8

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