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Cooperative Management of Invasive Species: A Dynamic Nash Bargaining Approach

Kelly M. Cobourn (), Gregory S. Amacher and Robert G. Haight
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Kelly M. Cobourn: Virginia Tech
Gregory S. Amacher: Virginia Tech
Robert G. Haight: USDA Forest Service Northern Research Station

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2019, vol. 72, issue 4, 1041-1068

Abstract: Abstract We use a Nash bargaining framework to examine scope for bargaining in invasive species problems where spread depends on the employment of costly controls. Municipalities bargain over a transfer payment that slows spread but requires an infested municipality to forgo nonmarket benefits from the host species. We find that when the uninfested municipality has a relative bargaining power advantage, bargaining may attain the first-best solution. However, in many cases a short-term bargaining agreement is unlikely to succeed, which suggests a role for higher levels of government to facilitate long-term agreements even when the details are left to municipalities to negotiate.

Keywords: Bioeconomics; Biological invasions; Emerald ash borer; Negotiation; Optimal control; Pest spread (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q57 Q23 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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