Panic-Based Overfishing in Transboundary Fisheries

Sareh Vosooghi

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2019, vol. 73, issue 4, No 14, 1287-1313

Abstract: Abstract This paper analyses sustainability of bilateral harvesting agreements in transboundary fisheries. Harvesting countries obtain public and private assessments regarding their stock of fish, and the stock experiences ecological changes. In addition to biological uncertainty, countries may face strategic uncertainty. A country that receives negative assessments about the current level of fish stock, may become ‘pessimistic’ about the assessment of the other coastal state, and this can ignite ‘panic-based’ overfishing. The paper examines the likelihood of overfishing and suggests a unique prediction about the possibility of abiding by bilateral fishing agreements. Conditions under which the outcome of the asymmetric-information model reduces to the symmetric-information game are discussed, and optimal policy instruments for intergovernmental management of the stock are offered.

Keywords: Regional Fisheries Management; Biological and strategic uncertainties; Equilibrium refinement; Global games; Risk dominance; Transboundary fishery; Ecological shifts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D82 D83 Q22 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-018-0299-8

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