Enforcement Federalism: Comparing the Effectiveness of Federal Punishment versus State Punishment

Dietrich Earnhart and Lana Friesen

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2021, vol. 78, issue 2, No 2, 227-255

Abstract: Abstract Responsibility for enforcing environmental protection laws often falls on both federal and state agencies. We investigate whether enforcement and monitoring taken by the federal agency—the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)—and enforcement and monitoring actions taken by U.S. state environmental agencies differentially affect the compliance behavior of pollution point sources regulated under the U.S. Clean Water Act. Our results demonstrate that federal inspections are more effective than state inspections, yet state fines are more effective than federal fines, at inducing compliance with Clean Water Act-imposed discharge limits.

Keywords: Enforcement; Monitoring; Inspections; Compliance; Wastewater (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K32 K42 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-020-00530-0

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