Voluntary Participation in International Environmental Agreements and Authority Structures in a Federation: A Note

Ryusuke Shinohara ()
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Ryusuke Shinohara: Hosei University

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2021, vol. 79, issue 1, No 2, 25-32

Abstract: Abstract We examine how a voluntary participation decision in international environmental negotiations affects the endogenous authority structure in a federation. In our model, the federal government of each country decides whether to delegate both the decision to participate in a negotiation that determines the abatement level of pollution (the level of the public good), and the negotiation itself, to a regional government of the polluter region. We show that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in which none of the federal governments chooses delegation, which is quite different from the authority structure in the absence of a voluntary participation decision. The main contribution is to explain why the federal government has an incentive not to delegate decisions to a regional government

Keywords: Delegation; International environmental agreements; Nash bargaining; Negotiation; Participation; Public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D62 H41 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-021-00550-4

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