Pollution control with imperfectly observable emissions

Armin Schmutzler

Environmental & Resource Economics, 1996, vol. 7, issue 3, 262 pages

Abstract: In this paper, a model of environmental regulation with imperfect monitoring of emissions is presented. The regulator can use linear output taxes and emission taxes to influence the pollution level of a risk-averse firm. In contrast to the perfect monitoring case, a tax mix will usually be optimal. The relative weight depends on the degree of risk aversion and monitoring imperfection, and on technological factors. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Keywords: Asymmetric information; pollution control; emission taxes; output taxes; monitoring problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/BF00782148

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