Empowerment of Social Norms on Water Consumption

Pauline Pedehour () and Lionel Richefort
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Pauline Pedehour: LEMNA, Université de Nantes

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2022, vol. 82, issue 3, No 5, 625-655

Abstract: Abstract This study develops a model of water extraction using endogenous social norms. Many users are connected by a unique shared resource that can become scarce in the case of over-exploitation. Preferences of individuals are guided by their extraction values and their taste for conformity to social norms which provide incentives to follow others. As the main result of this study, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is established under a sufficient condition. Subsequently, some comparative statics analysis shows the effects of changes in individual heterogeneous parameters, conformism, and network density on the global quantity extracted. Welfare and social optimum properties are established to avoid the tragedy of the commons and suboptimal consumption of water. Finally, this theoretical framework is completed by extensions to discuss anticonformist behaviours, levers of water preservation, and awareness of consumers.

Keywords: Comparative statics; Conformism; Nash equilibrium; Network theory; Social norms; Water extraction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D04 D80 Q01 Q25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Working Paper: Empowerment of Social Norms on Water Consumption (2022)
Working Paper: Empowerment of social norms on water consumption (2021)
Working Paper: Empowerment of social norms on water consumption (2021)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-022-00676-z

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