Altruistic Foreign Aid and Climate Change Mitigation

Arnaud Goussebaïle, Antoine Bommier (), Amélie Goerger () and Jean-Philippe Nicolaï ()
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Antoine Bommier: ETH Zurich
Amélie Goerger: ETH Zurich
Jean-Philippe Nicolaï: Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, INRAE, Grenoble INP, GAEL

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2023, vol. 84, issue 1, No 8, 219-239

Abstract: Abstract This paper considers one altruistic developed country and several heterogeneous developing countries. We demonstrate that the lack of coordination between countries in tackling climate change finds an optimal solution if developing countries can expect to receive development aid transfers from the developed country. The mechanism requires a sufficiently high level of altruism and specific timing, but a global coalition is not necessary. We also show that the developed country may democratically assign a delegate who is more altruistic than its median voter in order to benefit from the efficiency gain generated by positive development aid transfers.

Keywords: Altruism; Climate change; Development aid; International policies; Public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D64 F35 F53 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-022-00722-w

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