Stability of Efficient International Agreements on Solar Geoengineering

Irina Bakalova () and Mariia Belaia ()
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Irina Bakalova: Harvard University
Mariia Belaia: George Mason University

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2023, vol. 86, issue 3, No 12, 673-712

Abstract: Abstract Solar geoengineering (SG) may have the potential to reduce extreme climate damages worldwide. Yet, international coordination will make the difference between success and failure in leveraging it. Using a simple game-theoretic framework, we investigate whether the stability of an efficient, self-enforcing international agreement on SG is attainable. We demonstrate that side payments from countries less vulnerable to climate change to those more vulnerable can guarantee the stability of an efficient agreement. The size of the side payments will vary within a zone of possible agreement, which will change depending on certain key assumptions. For example, assuming stronger mitigation reduces the necessary payments. Alternatively, asymmetry in national damages from SG over-provision vs. under-provision justifies larger payments; here, the welfare-optimal strategy may be deployment that makes no one worse off. We also show that an agreement may be stable without side payments if deployment costs are substantial and counter-SG is available, while a moratorium may be socially optimal if SG brings substantial global non-excludable fixed costs.

Keywords: Solar geoengineering; International environmental agreements; Side payments; Free driver; Global cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D62 F53 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-023-00807-0

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