Long-term industrial equilibrium in an ITQ managed fishery

Rögnvaldur Hannesson

Environmental & Resource Economics, 1996, vol. 8, issue 1, 63-74

Abstract: This paper discusses long-term equilibrium in a fishery managed by individual transferable quotas. Rising prices or falling capital costs become capitalized in a higher value of quotas, implying higher capital costs for holding quotas. This may in fact reduce the size of each firm and lead to more firms existing in long-term equilibrium. Resource rent taxation by letting firms lose a certain share of their quota holdings each year is discussed and shown to be neutral. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Keywords: fisheries economics; ITQ's; neutral taxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/BF00340653

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