Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control I: Competition

Amitrajeet Batabyal

Environmental & Resource Economics, 1996, vol. 8, issue 2, 205-220

Abstract: I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock extermality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive industry. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under time consistent policies. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Keywords: environmental economics; regulation; tax; dynamic; game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: CONSISTENCY AND OPTIMALITY IN A DYNAMIC GAME OF POLLUTION CONTROL I: COMPETITION (1995)
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00357364

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