Tradeable emission permits regulations in the presence of imperfectly competitive product markets: Welfare implications

Eftichios Sartzetakis ()

Environmental & Resource Economics, 1997, vol. 9, issue 1, 65-81

Abstract: In the present paper, we analyse the interaction of a competitive market for emission permits with an oligopolistic product market. It is well known that a competitive permits market achieves the cost minimizing distribution of abatement effort among the polluting firms for a given reduction in emissions. However, when the product market is oligopolistic, it may redistribute production inefficiently among firms. It has been suggested that this inefficiency can outweigh the gains obtained from using emission permits instead of command and control. Although this argument is clearly correct under full information, it is shown in the present paper that it reverses under incomplete information. In particular, it is shown that when tradeable emission permits are specified according to the standard textbook example, they yield higher social welfare than the command and control regulation. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Keywords: emission permits; oligopoly; welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02441370

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