Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study
Antonio Cabrales (),
Rosemarie Nagel () and
Roc Armenter ()
Experimental Economics, 2007, vol. 10, issue 3, 221-234
Keywords: Global games; Risk dominance; Equilibrium selection; Common knowledge; C72; C91; C92; D82; G10; G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study (2002)
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