The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games

Stephan Kroll (), Todd Cherry and Jason Shogren

Experimental Economics, 2007, vol. 10, issue 4, 428 pages

Abstract: Economists and psychologists have long argued the origin of wealth influences individual behavior. In a previous study (Cherry et al., 2005), we found the origin of endowment did not significantly affect behavior in linear public good games with summation contribution technology. In such games, however, both Nash behavior (everybody gives nothing) and social optimal behavior (everybody gives the entire endowment) call for symmetric levels of contributions. Results from this new study indicate that the origin of wealth might matter in more asymmetric situations, such as in a best-shot public good game with heterogeneous groups. Copyright Economic Science Association 2007

Keywords: Endowment heterogeneity; Endowment origin; Best-shot public good experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Working Paper: The Impact of Endowment Heterogeneity and Origin on Contributions in Best-Shot Public Good Games (2004)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-006-9144-y

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