Economics at your fingertips  

The dark side of friendship: ‘envy’

Ramon Cobo-Reyes and Natalia Jiménez ()

Experimental Economics, 2012, vol. 15, issue 4, 547-570

Abstract: This paper studies the effect of social relations on convergence to the efficient equilibrium in 2×2 coordination games from an experimental perspective. We employ a 2×2 factorial design in which we explore two different games with asymmetric payoffs and two matching protocols: “friends” versus “strangers”. In the first game, payoffs by the worse-off player are the same in the two equilibria, whereas in the second game, this player will receive lower payoffs in the efficient equilibrium. Surprisingly, the results show that “strangers” coordinate more frequently in the efficient equilibrium than “friends” in both games. Network measures such as in-degree, out-degree and betweenness are all positively correlated with playing the strategy which leads to the efficient outcome but clustering is not. In addition, ‘envy’ explains no convergence to the efficient outcome. Copyright Economic Science Association 2012

Keywords: Coordination; Efficiency; ‘Envy’; Experiments; Friendship; Social networks; A14; C72; C92; D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: The dark side of friendship: envy (2007) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9313-0

Access Statistics for this article

Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair

More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

Page updated 2021-03-28
Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:15:y:2012:i:4:p:547-570