Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment

Flip Klijn, Joana Pais () and Marc Vorsatz

Experimental Economics, 2013, vol. 16, issue 1, 22 pages

Abstract: We experimentally investigate in the laboratory prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools and study how individual behavior is influenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the Gale–Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism independently of whether individuals can submit a complete or only a restricted ranking of the schools and (b) subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion are more likely to play “safer” strategies under the Gale–Shapley but not under the Boston mechanism. Both results have important implications for enrollment planning and the possible protection risk averse agents seek. Copyright Economic Science Association 2013

Keywords: School choice; Risk aversion; Preference intensities; Laboratory experiment; Gale–Shapley mechanism; Boston mechanism; Efficiency; Stability; Constrained choice; C78; C91; C92; D78; I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (62)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment (2015)
Working Paper: Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment (2010)
Working Paper: Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment (2010)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9329-5

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