Estimating the causal effect of beliefs on contributions in repeated public good games
Alexander Smith ()
Experimental Economics, 2013, vol. 16, issue 3, 414-425
Abstract:
We use instrumental variables for estimating the causal effect of beliefs on contributions in repeated public good games. The effect is about half as large as suggested by ordinary least squares. Thus, we present evidence that beliefs have a causal effect on contributions, but also that beliefs are endogenous. We compare the causal, belief-based model of contributions to alternative models based on matching the previous contributions of others and responding to one’s deviation from the average in the previous round. The causal, belief-based model performs well, indicating that beliefs have a central role in determining contributions. Copyright Economic Science Association 2013
Keywords: Public good games; Beliefs; Conditional cooperation; Reciprocity; Instrumental variables; C81; C91; C92; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-012-9345-5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:16:y:2013:i:3:p:414-425
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/10683/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-012-9345-5
Access Statistics for this article
Experimental Economics is currently edited by David J. Cooper, Lata Gangadharan and Charles N. Noussair
More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().