Group status, minorities and trust
Kei Tsutsui and
Daniel Zizzo
Experimental Economics, 2014, vol. 17, issue 2, 215-244
Abstract:
We present the results of an experiment measuring the impact of low group status and relative group size on trust, trustworthiness and discrimination. Subjects interact with insiders and outsiders in trust games and periodically enter markets where they can trade group membership. Low status and minority subjects have low morale: that is, they comparatively dislike being low status and being minority subjects. Group discrimination against low status and minority subjects is unchanged. However, low status subjects are deferential to high status subjects in terms of comparatively higher trust, and minority subjects are deferential to majority subjects in terms of comparatively higher trustworthiness. Copyright The Author(s) 2014
Keywords: Groups; Trust games; Deference; Discrimination; Status; Group size; C72; C91; Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:17:y:2014:i:2:p:215-244
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-013-9364-x
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