Taking, giving, and impure altruism in dictator games

Oleg Korenok, Edward Millner () and Laura Razzolini ()

Experimental Economics, 2014, vol. 17, issue 3, 488-500

Abstract: We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List’s (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007 ) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoff possibilities. We find that recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases, a result consistent with the hypothesis that the cold prickle of taking is stronger than the warm glow of giving. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007 ) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data. Copyright Economic Science Association 2014

Keywords: Dictator game; Impure altruism; Taking; C91; D01; D64; H30; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-013-9379-3

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