Doing good or doing harm: experimental evidence on giving and taking in public good games
Menusch Khadjavi () and
Andreas Lange ()
Experimental Economics, 2015, vol. 18, issue 3, 432-441
We replicate Andreoni (Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 1–21, 1995 )’s finding that agents behave more selfishly when taking from a public account than when giving to a public good. Based on a neutral language setting we add new insights into motivations to give or take in a linear public good setting: we find that Andreoni’s result is partly driven by the complete elimination of giving options in the taking frame. However, a pure extension of the action space into the taking domain also leads to a significant increase in selfish behavior. Copyright Economic Science Association 2015
Keywords: Public good; Voluntary provision; Taking; Experiments; H41; C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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