Is it a norm to favour your own group?

Donna Harris (), Benedikt Herrmann (), Andreas Kontoleon and Jonathan Newton

Experimental Economics, 2015, vol. 18, issue 3, 521 pages

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between norm enforcement and in-group favouritism behaviour. Using a new two-stage allocation experiment with punishments, we investigate whether in-group favouritism is considered as a social norm in itself or as a violation of a different norm, such as egalitarian norm. We find that which norm of behaviour is enforced depends on who the punisher is. If the punishers belong to the in-group, in-group favouritism is considered a norm and it does not get punished. If the punishers belong to the out-group, in-group favouritism is frequently punished. If the punishers belong to no group and merely observe in-group favouritism (the third-party), they do not seem to care sufficiently to be willing to punish this behaviour. Our results shed a new light on the effectiveness of altruistic norm enforcement when group identities are taken into account and help to explain why in-group favouritism is widespread across societies. Copyright Economic Science Association 2015

Keywords: In-group favouritism; Group identity; Social norms; In-group punishment; Out-group punishment; Third-party punishment; C92; D70; D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Working Paper: Is it a Norm to Favour Your Own Group? (2014)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-014-9417-9

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