Can you spare some change for charity? Experimental evidence on verbal cues and loose change effects in a Dictator Game

David Fielding and Stephen Knowles ()

Experimental Economics, 2015, vol. 18, issue 4, 718-730

Abstract: We use a simple laboratory experiment to measure the effect on altruism of (i) whether the participants’ choices are presented verbally or non-verbally, and (ii) whether the participants have a large amount of loose change. We find strong evidence for the first effect and weaker evidence for the second. These effects may explain some of the variation in the average level of generosity found in different Dictator Game results. Copyright Economic Science Association 2015

Keywords: Charitable giving; Dictator Game; Power of asking; Loose change effects; C91; D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Can You Spare Some Change For Charity? Experimental Evidence On Verbal Cues And Loose Change Effects In A Dictator Game (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:18:y:2015:i:4:p:718-730

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-014-9424-x

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