On the interpretation of bribery in a laboratory corruption game: moral frames and social norms

Ritwik Banerjee

Experimental Economics, 2016, vol. 19, issue 1, 240-267

Abstract: Past studies on laboratory corruption games have not been able to find consistent evidence that subjects make “immoral” decisions. A possible reason, and also a critique of laboratory corruption games, is that the experiment may fail to trigger the intended immorality frame in the minds of the participants, leading many to question the very raison d’être of laboratory corruption games. To test this idea, we compare behavior in a harassment bribery game with a strategically identical but neutrally framed ultimatum game. The results show that fewer people, both as briber and bribee, engage in corruption in the bribery frame than in the alternative and the average bribe amount is lesser in the former than in the latter. These suggest that moral costs are indeed at work. A third treatment, which relabels the bribery game in neutral language, indicates that the observed treatment effect arises not from the neutral language of the ultimatum game but from a change in the sense of entitlement between the bribery and ultimatum game frames. To provide further support that the bribery game does measure moral costs, we elicit the shared perceptions of appropriateness of the actions or social norm, under the two frames. We show that the social norm governing the bribery game frame and ultimatum game frame are indeed different and that the perceived sense of social appropriateness plays a crucial role in determining the actual behavior in the two frames. Furthermore, merely relabelling the bribery game in neutral language makes no difference to the social appropriateness norm governing it. This indicates that, just as in the case of actual behavior, the observed difference in social appropriateness norm between bribery game and ultimatum game comes from the difference in entitlement too. Finally, we comment on the external validity of behavior in lab corruption games. Copyright Economic Science Association 2016

Keywords: Corruption; Framing effects; Social norms; External validity; C91; C92; D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Journal Article: On the interpretation of bribery in a laboratory corruption game: moral frames and social norms (2016)
Working Paper: On the Interpretation of Bribery in a Laboratory Corruption Game: Moral Frames and Social Norms (2014)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9436-1

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