More than words: the effects of cheap talk in a volunteer’s dilemma

Christoph Feldhaus () and Julia Stauf
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Christoph Feldhaus: University of Cologne

Experimental Economics, 2016, vol. 19, issue 2, No 5, 342-359

Abstract: Abstract We theoretically and experimentally investigate a game in which exactly one person should make a costly effort to achieve a socially efficient outcome. This setting is commonly known as the volunteer’s dilemma. We implement one-way communication by allowing one player to send a message indicating whether she intends to volunteer and investigate the message’s effects on behavior and efficiency in the subsequent game. We theoretically demonstrate that there are asymmetric mixed-strategy equilibria in the volunteer’s dilemma and argue that one of these is likely to emerge through one-way communication. The experimental data support this notion. We find that the actions of both the sender and receiver of the message are crucially affected by the cheap talk stage and that efficiency in the volunteer’s dilemma increases with one-way communication.

Keywords: Volunteer’s dilemma; Cheap talk; Coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 C91 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9442-3

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