Detecting motives for cooperation in public goods experiments

Takafumi Yamakawa (), Yoshitaka Okano and Tatsuyoshi Saijo ()
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Takafumi Yamakawa: Osaka University

Experimental Economics, 2016, vol. 19, issue 2, No 13, 500-512

Abstract: Abstract This study clarifies the types of motives that are important as a source of cooperation in a linear public goods experiment. Our experimental design separates contributions into those due to confusion, one-shot motives (which includes altruism, warm-glow, inequality aversion, and conditional cooperation), and multi-round motives (which includes a strategic motive under incomplete information, a failure of backward induction, and reciprocity). The experiment reveals that multi-round motives plays an important role in driving cooperative behavior. Confusion and one-shot motives play a minor role.

Keywords: Cooperation; Motives; Public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Working Paper: Detecting motives for cooperation in public goods experiments (2015)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10683-015-9451-2

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